Crop Burning

Controlling crop burning in South Asia through local government actions

A solvable crisis: Crop residue burning, responsible for an estimated 66,000 deaths and USD 66 billion in economic damages annually across South Asia, is not an intractable problem.

Bureaucrats respond to local harm: District administrators are 10- 13% more likely to enforce anti-burning laws when weather patterns predict the smoke will pollute their own district, suggesting local incentives drive action.

Targeted enforcement works: Punishing a single farmer creates a powerful deterrent effect, making other farmers in the area 13% less likely to burn. This shows that strategic, limited enforcement can have a broad impact on compliance.

The smoke from burning fields that chokes our cities each winter is more than an agricultural problem—it is a governance problem. Gemma Dipoppa and Saad Gulzar move the focus from the farmer’s field to the district administrator’s office, asking a critical question: What makes the State act? The answers, grounded in extensive data, reveal the hidden incentives that drive local enforcement and offer a powerful, evidence-based argument for empowering local government as a primary line of defense in the fight for clean air.

Air pollution from crop residue burning in South Asia ranks among the world’s greatest public health threats. Estimates indicate that up to 60% of severe winter air pollution in parts of Pakistan and India can be attributed to this seasonal practice. Farmers often resort to burning crop residue as a quick and inexpensive method to clear fields for the next planting cycle, a practice much cheaper and widely accessible than mechanical alternatives.. However, this convenience comes at an immense cost to public health.

A Global Burden of Disease study attributes 66,000 deaths per year directly to crop residue burning across the region, corresponding to staggering economic damages estimated at USD 66 billion.1 The costs of this pollution are so high that analysis suggests compensating each farmer for the entire cost of adopting non-burning methods would

likely be cost-effective from the State’s perspective.¹ While farmers responsible for burning are often themselves economically marginalised, the continued practice of crop burning nevertheless leads to the preventable loss of thousands of lives annually.

This chapter investigates a crucial, often overlooked, aspect of pollution control: the role of district bureaucrats in enforcing anti-burning laws and the incentives that shape their actions. District administrators operate under conflicting pressures, needing to address crop burning while managing numerous other administrative tasks. We explore how these officials respond to varying pressures and incentives, the conditions under which their interventions yield effective results, and the potential impacts of their actions on public health and environmental quality. Our research provides insights into whether meaningful control over crop burning through bureaucratic action is achievable and the mechanisms through which such control could be exercised.3

The view from the district office: pressures and priorities

At the district level, designated administrators are primarily responsible for enforcing bans on crop burning. Both Pakistan and India have enacted laws making crop residue burning illegal, with violations potentially punishable by fines or even imprisonment. Administrative pressure on bureaucrats to curb burning originates from several sources, although the intensity of this pressure can vary significantly.

Legal mandates and judicial directives

Bureaucrats are legally obligated to enforce anti-burning laws, including by issuing penalties for farmers outlined in national and regional legislation. Furthermore, judicial directives, such as those issued by the Supreme Court of India, have reinforced this necessity, mandating state-level administrators to take decisive action against crop burning. In Pakistan, administrators possess powers under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which can be invoked to restrict activities like crop burning during high-risk periods.4

Public pressure and media scrutiny

Growing public awareness, particularly during the peak winter smog season, amplified by media attention, creates significant pressure on bureaucrats to demonstrate action. Increased access to real-time air quality data and consistent reporting by news organisations have fueled citizen concern and demands for action. The health impact is often immediate and visible; for example, around two million people reportedly visited medical facilities for respiratory issues in Pakistan’s Punjab province between October and

November 2024 due to extremely polluted air.5

Performance monitoring and career incentives

District administrators are subject to monitoring by senior officials, with performance related to crop burning control increasingly becoming a factor. Documented inaction can lead to formal reprimands and potentially harm an administrator’s career trajectory, as feedback from superiors influences evaluations, promotions, and transfers.

Despite these converging pressures, the actual enforcement of crop burning bans varies significantly across different districts. Several factors contribute to this heterogeneity. Bureaucrats retain discretion in allocating their time and resources across a multitude of competing tasks; and since the number of tasks they need to attend to is large, it is conceivable that they may not allocate high priority to controlling crop burning amidst other pressing duties. Furthermore, the degree of local embeddedness and accountability of district-level staff can differ, potentially influenced by whether they are recruited at the state/provincial or federal level. Pressure from farmers to halt the enforcement of antiburning laws, especially when well-organised, can also contribute to restricting the margin of action for bureaucrats. These dynamics collectively contribute to substantial variation in the effort each administrative unit devotes to controlling crop burning.

Asking the right questions: a new research approach

Our research sought to answer three key questions regarding the potential for bureaucratic control over crop burning.

Does self-interest motivate action?

Prior research suggests pollution often increases in areas that bear the externalities of their neighbour, implying that bureaucratic inaction can exacerbate pollution problems.6 ^{2 3} We explored the converse: do bureaucrats take active steps to reduce pollution when it directly impacts their own jurisdiction? If district administrators reduce burning to minimise local pollution, this indicates a willingness to act contrary to the assumption of bureaucratic inaction towards exerting any control over crop burning.

Can limited enforcement create broader deterrence?

Bureaucratic interventions, such as fines or penalties, might influence not only the farmers directly punished but could also discourage others by increasing the perceived risk of punishment. If such bureaucratic deterrence is effective, even limited enforcement actions could significantly reduce overall crop burning through spillover to other farmers.

A holistic approach that combines appropriately targeted enforcement with robust support measures for sustainable farming practices offers the most promising pathway towards resolving South Asia’s crop burning crisis, aligning local incentives with critical regional public health and global environmental priorities.

How does bureaucratic action impact health outcomes?

By understanding the relationship between bureaucratic action to reduce crop burning and critical health indicators like infant mortality, we can estimate the human cost associated with varying levels of enforcement. Connecting pollution from burning to health impacts allows an assessment of the potential benefits achievable through increased enforcement.

To address these questions, we gathered and analysed extensive satellite and administrative data spanning 12 years from the northern Indian subcontinent. This region included the states of Punjab in both Pakistan and India, Haryana, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar; encompassing an area home to approximately 500 million people. Our dataset comprised 18 million observations, allowing for granular analysis down to a 5-kilometre grid level. This large-scale, long-term dataset enabled us to gain robust insights into the potential for bureaucratic intervention in curbing crop burning.

Our study yielded several important findings, as follows.

Local incentives drive administrative action

Contrary to the notion that bureaucrats are largely passive regarding air pollution, our results demonstrate that district administrators and their teams do respond to crop burning when the resulting pollution affects their own jurisdictions. We found that the number of crop burning fires detected via satellite decreases by 10-13% on average when meteorological conditions predict that the pollution generated will predominantly impact the bureaucrat’s home district. This translates into an estimated annual reduction of approximately 54-72 fires per district. The effect is notably amplified during critical rice harvest seasons, when detected fires decrease by an average of 46%.

These findings suggest that the internalisation of pollution’s negative externalities serves as a significant motivator for bureaucratic action, challenging the common perception that local officials have limited influence over complex environmental issues like crop burning.

Targeted enforcement creates broader compliance

Bureaucratic punishment generates a demonstrable deterrent effect, particularly in areas where farmers perceive a higher likelihood of future enforcement. Our analysis indicates that farmers are approximately 13% less inclined to burn crop residue if they anticipate potential intervention from authorities. This finding implies that administrators do not necessarily need to penalise every single offending farmer; rather, strategically targeted enforcement in high-risk or highly visible areas can significantly influence compliance with crop burning bans. This insight is valuable as it suggests that enforcement efforts can effectively reduce burning without resorting to widespread punitive measures, which could be politically difficult and logistically challenging.

Reducing fires saves children’s lives

We combined output from a meteorological model, which calculates the atmospheric dispersion of polluting particles, with an instrumental variable approach to rigorously estimate the causal link between crop burning pollution and child health outcomes. Our analysis reveals a substantial increase in in-utero exposure to pollution originating from crop burning (specifically, a one standard deviation increase in exposure, corresponding roughly to a 70% rise in pollution levels relative to the mean in our sample) raises infant mortality by an additional 30-36 deaths per 1000 live births. This finding powerfully underscores that bureaucratic enforcement actions which successfully reduce crop burning yield significant public health benefits, particularly for vulnerable infant populations exposed to high levels of particulate matter during critical developmental periods. The findings on the health impact of crop burning underscore the critical role that local government action can play in mitigating the human costs of air pollution.

From evidence to action: a blueprint for local governance

Our findings offer several actionable implications for environmental governance and policy aimed at controlling crop burning in Pakistan and the wider region.

Empower district administrators

Given the impactful role that district bureaucrats can play in reducing crop burning when motivated, policies should focus on empowering these local administrators. This could involve providing additional resources specifically allocated for monitoring and enforcement activities, aligning performance incentives more closely with measurable pollution reduction targets, and offering more substantial operational support, particularly during the peak winter burning seasons. Strengthening local capacity could enable more proactive and effective responses to seasonal air quality crises. A similar focus on local enforcement in China yielded significant results; for instance, the Henan county government reportedly collected USD 37 million in penalties related to crop burning, contributing to a substantial reduction in air pollution.9

Strategic targeting of enforcement

Since deterrence effects can amplify the impact of limited bureaucratic resources and actions, enforcement efforts should be strategically focused. Prioritising areas with the highest historical incidence of burning or the greatest potential for repeat violations can maximise impact. By targeting a smaller number of violators within these high-risk zones, especially during peak burning seasons, administrators can achieve broader compliance

with fewer resources than attempting universal enforcement.

Leverage public engagement

Increased public awareness and active citizen involvement can significantly bolster official enforcement efforts, particularly when cyclical public pressure aligns with periods of heightened air pollution and media attention. Enhancing transparency regarding enforcement actions and resulting air quality improvements can help sustain public support for anti-burning measures and increase accountability for administrators to achieve tangible results.10

Improve cross-jurisdictional coordination

Crop burning and the resulting air pollution are inherently transboundary issues, crossing district, provincial and national boundaries. Our findings indicate a marked increase in pollution near the borders of administrative units that fail to coordinate their control efforts. Therefore, establishing institutional mechanisms that facilitate collaborative planning and action between jurisdictions, as well as between different government departments (e.g., agriculture, environment, revenue), is crucial. Such coordination can improve resource allocation, enable more comprehensive policy implementation, and significantly enhance overall enforcement effectiveness.

Develop farmer-centric alternatives

Enforcement, while necessary, is unlikely to be a sustainable long-term solution on its own. Policymakers must address the underlying economic and practical reasons why farmers resort to burning. This requires actively promoting and supporting viable alternatives. Key strategies could include subsidising the purchase or rental of mechanised equipment for residue clearing and incorporation, supporting research and extension services for crop diversification towards less residue-intensive rotations, and implementing positive incentive programmes rewarding farmers for adopting sustainable, non-burning farming practices. Policies that balance enforcement measures with accessible support for alternative methods are most likely to encourage widespread and lasting adoption of nonburning practices.

Our research highlights the significant, though often underestimated, potential for local bureaucratic action to mitigate the severe air pollution resulting from agricultural crop burning in South Asia. While this practice is frequently viewed as an intractable problem driven by deep-seated agricultural traditions and economic constraints, our findings suggest that district-level administrators already play a role in reducing pollution, particularly when they internalise its direct impacts on their own jurisdictions. By leveraging their discretion and implementing targeted enforcement, these officials can create deterrent effects that amplify the impact of their actions, yielding meaningful reductions in burning even within challenging institutional and resource contexts.

We demonstrate that district administrators possess greater potential to influence crop burning practices than is typically recognised. With appropriate resources, strategic

targeting, and alignment of incentives, local bureaucrats can make a meaningful difference in controlling one of the top contributors to unhealthy air in South Asia. Our results encourage a re-evaluation of the role of local government in environmental management, emphasising that existing governance structures, if effectively activated and supported, hold significant promise for driving positive change.

Future research should delve deeper into the dynamics of bureaucratic action in environmental governance. Studying the specific interactions between local officials, various sectoral departments (agriculture, environment, etc.), and citizen groups can provide a more comprehensive understanding of how governments can better manage multifaceted environmental challenges like air pollution. Additionally, investigation into the motivations, constraints, behaviours, and decision-making processes of farmers themselves will be essential for designing policy responses that are both effective and equitable. Ultimately, a holistic approach that combines appropriately targeted enforcement with supportive measures for sustainable farming offers the most promising pathway towards resolving South Asia’s crop burning crisis, aligning local incentives with global public health and environmental priorities.

Gemma Dipoppa is an Assistant Professor in Political Science at Columbia University, studying the political economy of migration, crime, and environment.

Dr. Saad Gulzar is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame. His research is on the political economy of development and environment, focusing on South Asia.

In this visual taxonomy, Maaz Jaan contrasts the traditional stoves that trap women in a cycle of indoor pollution with the modern solutions that offer a way out. The illustrations highlight the stark technological gap that defines energy poverty, showing how a shift to clean cooking is a matter of life and death.

Footnotes

1. Jack, B. K., Jayachandran, S., Kala, N., & Pande, R. (2024). Money (not) to burn: Payments for ecosystem services to reduce crop residue burning. American Economic Review Insights. Forthcoming. ↩

2. Kahn, M. E., Li, P., & Zhao, D. (2015). Water pollution progress at borders: The role of changes in China’s political promotion incentives. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 7(4), 223–242. ↩

3. Lipscomb, M., & Mobarak, A. M. (2016). Decentralization and pollution spillovers: Evidence from the re-drawing of county borders in Brazil. The Review of Economic Studies, 84(1), 464–502. ↩